Reviews
"Primarily utilizing Arab primary sources, Shemesh reconstructs the history of the decade preceding the Six Day War between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. His reliance on previously unexamined Arab sources leads him to a number of novel conclusions, the most important of which include the notion that the Sinai War (of October 1956) had exacerbated rather than alleviated ArabIsraeli tensions and the Palestinian problem, that Nasir of Egypt was rational in his preparations for the conflict and that responsibility for the military fiasco is primarily attributable to Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, that Egyptian commitment to Palestinian self-determination was strong and not an opportunistic fig leaf, that the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was a major trigger for the conflict, that the defeat of Arab forces in the war prompted the Arab states to decisively turn towards political processes in order to resolve the conflict, and that the Israeli seizure of the West Bank served to strengthen the political regime of Jordan." Reference & Research Book News, "Primarily utilizing Arab primary sources, Shemesh reconstructs the history of the decade preceding the Six Day War between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. His reliance on previously unexamined Arab sources leads him to a number of novel conclusions, the most important of which include the notion that the Sinai War (of October 1956) had exacerbated rather than alleviated ArabIsraeli tensions and the Palestinian problem, that Nasir of Egypt was rational in his preparations for the conflict and that responsibility for the military fiasco is primarily attributable to Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, that Egyptian commitment to Palestinian self-determination was strong and not an opportunistic fig leaf, that the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was a major trigger for the conflict, that the defeat of Arab forces in the war prompted the Arab states to decisively turn towards political processes in order to resolve the conflict, and that the Israeli seizure of the West Bank served to strengthen the political regime of Jordan." - Reference & Research Book News, "Primarily utilizing Arab primary sources, Shemesh reconstructs the history of the decade preceding the Six Day War between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. His reliance on previously unexamined Arab sources leads him to a number of novel conclusions, the most important of which include the notion that the Sinai War (of October 1956) had exacerbated rather than alleviated ArabIsraeli tensions and the Palestinian problem, that Nasir of Egypt was rational in his preparations for the conflict and that responsibility for the military fiasco is primarily attributable to Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, that Egyptian commitment to Palestinian self-determination was strong and not an opportunistic fig leaf, that the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was a major trigger for the conflict, that the defeat of Arab forces in the war prompted the Arab states to decisively turn towards political processes in order to resolve the conflict, and that the Israeli seizure of the West Bank served to strengthen the political regime of Jordan." - Reference & Research Book News, "A valuable contribution to the understanding of Arab politics in the decade before the Six-Day War. Well-referenced and injecting new Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian documents into the narrative, Shemesh's book challenges historians' conventional wisdom… a necessary addition to any serious library or scholar's bookshelf." - Middle East Quarterly, "A valuable contribution to the understanding of Arab politics in the decade before the Six-Day War. Well-referenced and injecting new Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian documents into the narrative, Shemesh's book challenges historians' conventional wisdom... a necessary addition to any serious library or scholar's bookshelf." -- Middle East Quarterly, "A valuable contribution to the understanding of Arab politics in the decade before the Six-Day War. Well-referenced and injecting new Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian documents into the narrative, Shemesh's book challenges historians' conventional wisdom... a necessary addition to any serious library or scholar's bookshelf." Middle East Quarterly, "Primarily utilizing Arab primary sources, Shemesh reconstructs the history of the decade preceding the Six Day War between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. His reliance on previously unexamined Arab sources leads him to a number of novel conclusions, the most important of which include the notion that the Sinai War (of October 1956) had exacerbated rather than alleviated Arab-Israeli tensions and the Palestinian problem, that Nasir of Egypt was rational in his preparations for the conflict and that responsibility for the military fiasco is primarily attributable to Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, that Egyptian commitment to Palestinian self-determination was strong and not an opportunistic fig leaf, that the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was a major trigger for the conflict, that the defeat of Arab forces in the war prompted the Arab states to decisively turn towards political processes in order to resolve the conflict, and that the Israeli seizure of the West Bank served to strengthen the political regime of Jordan." -- Reference & Research Book News
