Original US 1910 dated T Handle shovel cover ww1 364th inf CoE (91st Div) marked

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Original US 1910 dated T Handle shovel cover ww1 364th inf CoE (91st Div) marked:
$97.50

Rare OriginalUS issued1910 dated cover for the T handle shovel that was worn under the mess tin pouch on the m1910 pack. Unalted, shows stains and wear. One wearhole on teh side but good overall shape. The leather staps isvery good and can still be adjusted and support the weight if used. Only the back strap seen broke loose but still there. The cover was usd all teh the way up to WW1 wth issued unit marking to the 364th infantry Company E marked in 2 places. This unit would beaction being a favorite targetof german artillery. SOme history below,

AT ELEVEN-THIRTY that night (23/12 o\'clock) the heavy long range guns of the army artillery opened fire on selected targets in the enemy country. This bombardment grew in power and in intensity throughout the night. At 2:30 o\'clock, all the guns of the corps and divisional artillery, silent up to that moment, went into action together. It is useless to try to describe that bombardment; those who lay under it during the hours before the \"jump-off\" will never forget it. It was so vast, so stunning, and the noise was so overwhelming that no one could grasp the whole. The German trenches were marked in the darkness by a line of leaping fire, punctuated now and then by the higher bursts of some particularly heavy shell. The retaliatory fire by German batteries passed over the heads of our leading regiments. Although the 363rd Infantry found no trenches sufficient for protection, and as, the night was warm them men preferred lying on the ground on the hill, no casualty occurred during the bombardment, as projectiles from the our own artillery passed well over the heads of the men.

When the leading waves of the 363rd Infantry passed over La Cigalerie Butte, they entered the valley of the Buanthe into a cloud and mist which completely concealed them on Vauquois Hill less than a half-mile to the west. Similarly, the 181st Brigade, advancing with the 362nd on the right and the 361st on the left, was able to cross No-man\'s-land (the valley of the Buanthe) through this cloud of smoke and mist without suffering casualties. All of the 363rd waves and the liaison group between the 35th and 91st Divisions crossed No-man\'s-land thus concealed, the last elements leaving La Cigalerie Butte at 6 o\'clock.

The barrage lifted and rolled off through Cheppy Wood at the specified rate of 100 yards in every five minutes. The three leading regiments passed through the prepared lanes in the old French wire, deployed in No-man\'s-land and went forward without opposition. There was no delay in their movement.

The 364th, with Headquarters 182nd Brigade, having encountered some difficulty in finding lanes through the wires between Mont des Auheux and La Cigalerie Butte, reached the jumping-off line at 6:30 o\'clock, moving forward at 7 o\'clock, thus more than 500 meters behind the 363rd. The leading battalion, the 1st, alth6ugh late, was able to cross No-man\'s-land without serious resistance; but when the 2nd Battalion, headquarters and machine gun companies with Brigade Headquarters reached the valley of the Buanthe, the mist and smoke had risen and they were subjected to machine gun fire from the northern slope of Vauquois Hill and later to artillery fire. This checked the rear elements of the 364th near La Fonderie Farm and many casualties were suffered, the wounded being evacuated to a dressing station south of La Cigalerie Butte. The temporary confusion was quickly corrected and the regiment went forward, reaching shelter from view in Bois de Cheppy.

Throughout the morning the 364th pushed forward, the 1st and 2nd Battalions on the left, of the 363rd Infantry, some of its elements overtaking the 363rd near Very. Companies \"C\" and \"F\" were in brigade sector, others in the zone of the 35th Division. Colonel H. C. Jewett, 316th Engineers, was sent forward about 9 o\'clock to relieve Brigadier General F. S. Foltz, and overtook and assumed command of the brigade near Very crossroads. The 182nd Brigade was assembled during the night

Meanwhile, the Division reserve, under Lieut. Colonel Endicott, had been ordered to move forward and cross No-man\'s-land near Pont des 4 Enfants, where engineers had built a small bridge over which machine gun carts could pass. Lieutenant Colonel Endicott took the motorized 346th Machine Gun Battalion to Avocourt, to follow the Avocourt-Very road on the trucks, while the Division Commander and aides led the remainder of the Division reserve to Pont des 4 Enfants, over shell-torn Cheppy Wood, overtaking the 181st Brigade south of the Ravin de Lai Fuon. The two infantry battalions, with machine gun companies attached, were stationed between the two infantry brigades, ready to support either. Many prisoners and machine guns were captured by the two brigades in passing through Bois de Cheppy.

The battered enemy front-line trenches were found with few defenders, scattered with the debris of a hasty evacuation, probably carried out during the evening before. These trenches were left behind, and our first waves penetrated into the Bois de Cheppy. The smoke and fog were so thick that the deployed troops had great trouble in keeping their alignment and intervals. In spite of these things, our leading elements crossed the woods and arrived at the German positions at La Neuve Grange Farm and along the Ravin de Lai Fuon.

As the machine gun nest was the backbone of the Boche defense, and as it was one of the principal obstacles that our troops had to continuously battle against for the rest of that day and during the three days following, it may not be amiss to describe it here. The nest may consist of one or several guns, sometimes set in prepared emplacements, sometimes merely tucked away in bushes or in the ruins of a house. In every case the guns themselves were carefully concealed, and there was usually some form of protection for the crew. The pieces seldom fired to their own front, but were so placed as to rake the front of other nests or of obstacles such as wire belts and woods. When the attackers are held up by machine gun fire, the shooting seldom comes from directly in the foreground, but from some position on the flank which they cannot easily locate. They are, therefore, unable to advance until the nest has been taken by maneuvering around it. This movement, on the other hand, is often also held up by fire from an entirely different nest, and so the whole line is stopped. As machine guns come into action suddenly and their killing power is terrific they cannot be reduced by frontal attacks of waves of infantry, but must be either shelled out or held under our own infantry and machine gun fire until they can be stalked by little groups of determined men. These dash from cover to cover, or work around the emplacements by stealth, getting close enough to put the gunners or the piece itself out of action. To ward off these attacks, the Germans placed snipers and bomb throwers in concealment close by the guns. Such were the nests that confronted our men as they reached the ravine of Lai Fuon and the open country to the north of Cheppy Wood.

The machine guns along this line were overcome and the 181st Brigade, having straightened its front along the ravine, pushed forward through the Bois de Very and the Bois Chehemin. Before the 182nd Brigade lay somewhat more open country, but great trouble was encountered in the small woods along the Montfaucon-Cheppy road, where there were numerous strong points that had to be taken one by one. In this work the infantry and the guns of the 348th Machine Gun Battalion cooperated, and by noon the leading elements came over the hill and entered the wrecked village of Very, putting down the resistance of the Boche who remained and driving many more out of the houses and across the ridge to the northwest.

About 4:30 P. M. (16:30 o\'clock) the 122nd Field Artillery reported to the Division Commander at le Ravin de Lai Fuon, having passed the shell-torn village of Avocourt, and the road thence toward Very after repair by the engineers. He was directed to assign one battalion to support the attack of the 181st Infantry Brigade over the Bois Chehemin, and to send the other battalion along the Avocourt-Very road to report to the 182nd Brigade near Very crossroads. Through some mistake by the Artillery Commander, the battalion which had unlimbered and prepared to support the attack of the 181st Brigade was also detailed later to proceed to Very crossroads. As the 181st Brigade had fought its way to open ground and could see the German positions near Epinonville, about 2,000 yards north, the Brigade Commander attacked, although the battalion of artillery which was ready to support him was diverted and thus did not fire. Their lines could be seen from the Division Commander\'s position near“ the Very crossroads, bravely advancing over open ground under heavy fire until checked at the ridge on which is Epinonville. Some troops penetrated Epinonville, but the brigade was obliged to fall back to, the ravine south thereof for the night.

The 363rd Infantry, after making numerous captures in Cheppy, encountered strong resistance on emerging from the Bois de Cheppy from La Neuve Grange Farm. After assaulting this position it advanced through Very to high ground north of the city, where it dug in for the night. The 364th Infantry, on the left of and following the 363rd, advanced beyond Very, digging in for the night southwest of, but near, the 363rd. The line occupied by the Division for the night extended from just south of Epinonville, which was the Eastern limit of the Division zone, around the head of the Ravin des Balonvaux (Plank Road Hollow), thence along the western slope of the ravine north of the city of Very, into the zone of the 35th Division. The Division P. C. was established at Very crossroads, 800 meters east of Very, at 18 o\'clock (6 p. M.), the Division staff moving from C6te 290 later that evening; the 122nd and 124th Field Artillery taking position during the night near the Division P.C.

The Division reserve was placed in the south of Very. The combat liaison detachment, Company \"L,\" 364th Infantry, and one machine gun company had inclined to the west, endeavoring \'to gain touch with the 35th Division, and fought their way north actually in the area of the 35th Division, and in front of that division throughout the day. As heavy firing was heard at night to the west of the Very crossroads, orders were sent this combat liaison group to move toward Very and cover the left of the Division. This detachment rejoined the Division zone about daylight September 27.

Although no tanks had been assigned to the 91st Division, a detachment thereof under Captain Ferrer, 348th Machine Gun Battalion, co-operated with some tanks in the attack near Cheppy, which resulted in the capture of a large number of Germans. They then moved on the Cheppy-Very road to Very. The first day\'s fighting had broken two German lines, penetrated of the third, and had realized an advance of eight kilometers.

During the 26th the auxiliary services had also been working fast and furiously. With the first wave went engineers to throw bridges over the Buanthe creek. Other engineers fell to work on the road from Avocourt across No-man\'s-land, which had, of course, been pounded out of existence during the past three years. Others pushed forward and cut detours around two great tank pits that the Germans had dug in the road farther north. By noon the traffic was flowing, or rather bumping, over the old No-man\'s4and and into Cheppy Wood--first the combat wagons with their ammunition, then the artillery and finally the trucks of the Division supply trains. The vigor with which this work was accomplished and the speed with which the trains followed up over the extemporized road, full of shell craters and mud holes, played an extremely important part in allowing the Division to continue its successful drive of the first day. The\' signal troops, then as later, were always with the advancing infantry and machine guns, and telephone communication, without which no modern battle can be waged, was quickly established. The lines, however, were continually cut by shells and had to be patrolled and repaired under heavy fire day and night.

In addition to the lines established by the 316th Field Signal Battalion, the 181st Brigade found insulated German wire in the Bois de Cheppy and used that wire in its advance, as did the Division Commander for communication with the Division P. C. at C“te 290.

SECOND DAY, SEPTEMBER 27

The night of the 26th-27th was spent in ascertaining location of units of the Division and issuing orders to renew the attack. The passage through the Bois de Cheppy and the hard fighting of the preceding afternoon had naturally resulted in the mixing of men from unit to unit and the displacement of companies and battalions from their proper sectors. The dispositions taken up at this time for the morn\'s advance were as follows: Both brigades were to attack towards the Eclisfontaine-Epinonville line. The two infantry battalions with machine gun companies attached which had served as Division reserve were returned to their brigades, so that each regiment might attack in column of three battalions. The 181st Brigade attacked the strong ridge on which Epinonville was located with the 362nd Infantry on the right of the 361st. Three separate assaults on Epinonville were made, but each was repulsed and by night the brigade was at the foot of the ridge of Epionville, which town had been entered on the 26th and three times on the 27th.

When the attack moved forward it met an enemy reinforced and strongly located in a multitude of machine gun nests, supported also by a, well-directed and cruel artillery fire that grew in intensity throughout the day. The 361st passed through Epinonville, clearing out groups of the enemy as it went, but when an attempt was made to debouch from the town and the road leading west from it the troops were met by such a hail of machine gun bullets from the, woods and orchards beyond that no progress could be made. The fighting on this wing kept up all day, our troops endeavoring to get beyond the town, but being driven back again and again. Hostile shelling became very severe, both upon the assaulting troops and also upon the town, but being driven back again and again. Hostile shelling became very severe, both upon the assaulting troops and also upon the supports who had dug themselves in on the slopes south of the town. This fire was accurate and persistent and was almost constantly regulated by low-flying enemy planes. About noon the advance of the division on our right was checked and their men fell back under severe shelling between Epinonville and Ivoiry to positions behind our right flank.

On the left somewhat greater advance was possible. The 182nd Brigade attacked with the 364th Infantry on the right of the 363rd Infantry. Colonel G. McD. Weeks was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Mudgett, 364th Infantry, before the attack. The advance was delayed by hostile artillery, guided apparently by hostile planes which hovered over the brigade all morning. The 364th maintained contact with the 361st, but the 363rd inclined so far toward the west in an endeavor to gain touch with the 35th Division that some units thereof crossed the Varennes- -Eslisfontaine road, moving toward Serieux Farm, and came under artillery fire, probably that of the 35th Division, as the 363rd had moved into the zone of that division.

The 364th was held up in front of the town of Eclisfontaine before broad belts of wire swept by machine guns. With the help of our artillery, however, they managed about four-thirty in the afternoon to break through, capture Eclisfontaine and and Les Bouleaux Bois and organize those positions for the night. The 363rd reached the ravine running southwest from Eclisfontaine about noon. The Eclisfontaine-Varennes road on the other side of the ravine was strongly held by the enemy, and it was some time before it was finally taken and the regiment was enabled to push on into Les Bouleaux Bois.

The total day\'s advance had reached a line running through Epinonville, Eclisfontaine and Les Bouleaux Bois. This position was being organized when notice came from Corps Headquarters that a barrage of army artillery might be laid down on the Eclisfontaine-Varennes road during the night. It was accordingly necessary to withdraw the troops of the 182nd Brigade south of that road and out of the town of Eclisfontaine. As shells from distant heavy artillery were falling south of the road and on Epinonyille, the main line for the night was established a little farther to the south, outposts holding practically all the territory gained during the day. Many casualties had resulted in taking Cote 231 and Eclisfontaine, and it was disappointing to give up this place because another division had failed to keep abreast of the 91st.

THIRD DAY, SEPTEMBER 28

On the morning of the 28th the advance was renewed; the 181st Brigade attacking with the 361st in front of the 362nd through Epinonville, two battalions of the former in the front line with the remainder of the regiment in support. The 362nd formed the brigade reserve. This brigade passed through Epinonville, seized Les Epinettes Bois and the Bois de Cierges. During this advance Major Oscar F. Miller, leading the advance battalion, 361st Infantry, was wounded three times before he gave up. He died the next day. A Medal of Honor was awarded him and delivered to his widow, for his heroic conduct above and beyond duty.

The 182nd Brigade, on the left, the 364th leading with two battalions in front line and remainder in support, pushed the attack, and again the troops were obliged to work well out of their sector and into the zone of the 35th Division on their left, in order to overcome machine gun nests that were taking them in flank Starting from their line south of and roughly parallel to the Eclisfontaine -- Varennes road, they reached the road and Eclisfontaine without great opposition, but were there held by fire from, Serieux Farm on their left and from Les Bouleaux Bois. Into which the enemy had returned during the night. It was before the farm was captured and the woods were again thoroughly cleared. Then came the task of taking Exmorieux Farm, a strong center of resistance that was causing great trouble. This accomplished, the attack of the 364th and 363rd pressed on, took the Bois de Baulny, Tronsol Farm and the slope north of the latter.

During the day, while the 364th had been pushing to the north, the 363rd had been drawn more and more into a northwesterly course, into the zone of the 35th Division. The necessity of taking Seneux Farm had inaugurated this movement, and the loss of touch with the 35th Division on the left had made it imperative to hold the ever-lengthening flank exposed by the advance of the 364th. Thus at nightfall the 363rd, in contact in the neighborhood of Tronsol Farm with the 364th, was facing almost due west and was reaching out, so to speak, to the southwest for contact with the 35th Division. Contact was reported with the 35th Division that afternoon, but the troops proved to be a combat liaison group, the main body of the 35th Division being farther south.

The 91st Division, as far back as Seneux Farm, was exposed to attack from the west, and as far back as the southern edge of Bois Emont, to attack from the east. Much machine fire came from Bois Emont and artillery fire from Cierges and Grange aux Bois Farm.

On the right of the 91st sector somewhat the same condition pertained. The 361st, having taken the Bois de Cierges, gained contact on its left with the 364th; but its right was in the air, the left regiment of the 37th Division being still south of the Bois Emont, although it had been reported that the 37th had taken Cierges at noon that day. The 362nd, however, lay behind the 361st and was so placed as to repel any attempt to encircle our advanced units. Headquarters had moved to Epionville in the early afternoon and the Division reserve dug itself in at the orchard southwest of Epinonville.

The artillery fire had become much more severe from morning on it continued throughout the night. A heavy rain had also come on and increased as darkness closed in. The men had been fighting steadily for three days, had had no blankets to protect them from the cold September nights, and because of their rapid advance it had been impossible to serve them any hot food since before the jump-dff. The first ambulances reached the Division P. C. on the 29th at Epinonville. To that time, trucks and wagons at night were the only transportation for the wounded. They had been caught in the jammed Avocourt-Very road behind artillery, trucks, etc. There were not sufficient ambulances to evacuate wounded until September 30. During the first four days men who could walk found their way back to our or other field hospitals, but others were sheltered in German dugouts subject to shell fire and fed as well as circumstances permitted. Some merely sat against trees, waiting for transportation. The Division on the 29th, however, showed how little the soldiers of the 91st were affected by the conditions.

FOURTH DAY, SEPTEMBER 29

At 23 o\'clock (11 P. M.), September 28, the Corps Commander directed renewal of the attack at 7 A. M. the next day, adding: \"2. Divisions will advance independently of each other, pushing the attack with utmost vigor and regardless of cost.\" The 91st Division obeyed this order on that memorable Sunday with renewed energy and inspiration, believing each division would be prompted by the same impulse to \"do or die\" for the Fifth Corps which inspired the 91st when assigned the important task of \"carrying the ball through the center of the First American Army.\" Division orders at 23:30 o\'clock directed heavy artillery fire on Gesnes, support of each brigade by a light regiment (75\'s), and advance by each brigade in its proper zone toward the American Army objective (line of hills north of the Gesnes-Exermont road).

On request of the Commander of the 182nd Brigade, the 1st Battalion, 316th Engineers, was ordered to join that brigade by 4 o\'clock, September 29.

At 17:36 o\'clock, September 28, the Corps Chief of Staff had informed the 91st Division that the 35th Division was in Exermont.

The 362nd Infantry passed through the 361st, moving at 7 o\'clock north through Bois de Cierges toward Gesnes. Reaching a line abreast of Grange aux Bois Farm, the 362nd received artillery and machine gun fire from that place (in zone of the 37th Division) and from hills northeast and northwest of Gesnes. It was forced to retire to positions held all night by the 361st. At 10 o\'clock advance was renewed with similar check and retreat. The 181st Brigade was then ordered by Division Commander to take Grange aux Bois Farm to cover the right flank of the Division. With the help of accompanying guns, 122nd Field Artillery, machine guns, etc., a battalion of the 361st Infantry occupied this farm. Another covered the right flank, facing Bois Emont.

Major George W. Farwell, 361st Infantry, was fatally wounded in this operation. A Distinguished Service Cross was awarded later and delivered to his widow.

The 363rd Infantry, with two companies of the 316th Engineers was directed to pass through the 364th and to cross the open ground north of Bois de Baulny. It was checked at the road Tronsol Farm-Grange aux Bois Farm by fire from the latter place. This resulted in orders from the Division Commander to the 181st Brigade to take Grange aux Bois Farm, as mentioned above.

Some of the 364th remained unrelieved at the north edge of Bois de Baulny. Lieutenant Colonel Mudgett, commanding the 364th was severely wounded about noon, Major Gregory succeeding to command. Major A. B. Richardson, commanding 1st Battalion of the 364th, was wounded during the afternoon.

Holding Tronsol Farm, just in zone of the 35th Division, and Grange aux Bois Farm, just in zone of 37th Division, the 91st at 14:30 o\'clock was ready to advance farther. Both farms were to be held. The 181st Brigade was directed to advance toward Gesnes, and the 182nd Brigade, as soon as its right was covered by the 181st Brigade, to advance across the the Exermont-Gesnes road toward the American Army objective.

The Commanding General of the 181st Brigade at 15:30 o\'clock reported that the 74th Brigade (37th Division) had retired at 14:10 o\'clock south and east of Bois Emont. Nevertheless, he directed his brigade, less two battalions of the 361st protecting his right, to take Gesnes. The 362nd Infantry, in three lines, with two companies of the 34 7th Machine Gun Battalion, advanced, Colonel J. H. Parker leading the advance battalion. The 2nd Battalion, 361st, followed the 362nd. Artillery preparation preceded the attack, and a rolling barrage preceded the leading battalion.

It was met from the jump-off by a terrific artillery counter-barrage, accompanied by the hardest sort of machine gun fire from the front and right flank. It went forward grimly, nevertheless, passed across the open field, and in spite of large casualties reached Gesnes and drove out the enemy, one battalion of the 362nd reaching Hill 255. The 2nd Battalion, 361st Infantry passed beyond the town and up the slopes to the northwest, reaching the army objective behind the battalion of the 362nd. At nightfall this position was being consolidated, and the 361st, less one battalion, was covering the exposed right flank where it was severely pounded by artillery from the northeast.

During the afternoon of this day conditions on the left of the Division were becoming alarming. A great concentration of Germans was reported at Exermont. The 70th Brigade, 35th Division, on the left had fallen back toward Baulny and almost reached that place at 15:50 o\'clock. Furthermore, bodies of German troops were actually beginning to emerge from a wood on our left flank. The guns of the 348th Machine Gun Battalion, posted south of Transol Farm, instantly caught and broke up this gathering and a counter-attack by our engineers temporarily assured the safety of the flank. At the same time, some troops of the 182nd Brigade pushed forward to the north and patrols crossed the Gesnes creek and reached the south edge of the Bois de la Morine, close to the extreme left of the 362nd.

Just before news of this success (by runner from Major Bradbury near Gesnes) reached the Division Commander he received report from the 91st Division liaison officer at Headquarters, 35th Division (Cheppy), of the retirement of the 70th Brigade to Baulny, and that the Commanding General of the 35th Division was returning to Cheppy. The 74th Brigade, 37th Division, had been seen retiring about noon toward Ivoiry. Thus, if the remainder of the infantry, 91st Division moved forward to join the advance elements at the American Army objective, there would remain insufficient support for the reamainder fo the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, still in the ravine south of Epionville, and the line of communication through Epionville and Very might be cut by German forces on our left, driving the 70th Brigade to Baulny, and the German forces in Bois Emont and Cierges on our right, which had repulsed and driven back the 74th Brigade, 37th Division. The advance elements of the 91st Division were four kilometers ahead of the 74th Brigade on their right and about six kilometers ahead of the 70th Brigade on their left. Message was sent to the Commanding, General, 35th Division, asking him to cover the 58th Field Artillery Brigade and the Epionville-Very road. Liasion officer of the 91st Division reported the Commanding General, 35th Division, could not, as he was asking help from divisions on his right and left. Message was sent by an aide to Commanding General, 37th Division, asking him to order the 74th Brigade forward to occupy Bois Emont, or at least to resume its morning positions so as to permit all the 91st Division infantry to occupy the army objective then held by only two battalions. The Commanding General, 74th Brigade at Ivoiry, to whom the message was shown, said his Brigade had suffered fifty percent loss, and he could not make it go forward. Later, the Commanding General, 37th Division sent message that his division could not move up to support the 91st Division or cover its right flank.

Orders were then sent to prevent the 361st and 364th advances, and to elements farther ahead to hold their positions. The situation was reported to Headquarters, Fifth Corps, and permission received to hold any positions deemed suitable which could be held. As the entire infantry of the 91st Division could not be advanced to the hills north of Gesnes, it was necessary to order withdrawal of the advanced elements of each brigade to the line along the northern border of the Bois de Baulny and Bois de Cierges, holding the two farms named above as centers of resistance.

A glance at the map will show the actual extent of our front at dark on the 29th. Instead of a scant two kilometers (the width of the division sector just north of Gesnes) which the 91st would have been responsible for if its neighbors had been abreast of it, the line ran from the middle of the east edge of the Bois de Cierges through Grange aux Bois Farm, up to and around Gesnes, across the south tip of the Bois de la Morine, south around Tronsol Farm, across the Ravine de la Mayche and again south south as far as Serieux Farm, a total distance of eight kilometers. This was, of course, an impossible situation. Our attenuated line was open to attack from either flank and we risked having our forward troops, or, indeed, the whole Division, cut off and surrounded. Orders were accordingly sent to the 362nd and 363rd to withdraw during the night. The Division reserve, consisting of only the 346th Machine Gun Battalion, was placed on the road toward Seneux Farm to cover the artillery and road to Very, thus assuring the safety of the left flank. Before morning a new and shorter line of resistance, ordered by Headquarters, Fifth Corps, was organized. It ran from the middle of the Bois de Cierges southwest through Les Bouleaux Bois. The dearly won terrain to the north of this line was not, however, entirely given up, as troops still held Grange aux Bois Farm, Bois de Cierges, Bois de Baulny, Tronsol Farm and the country from there south to Seneux Farm. Our patrols guarded the country up to Gesnes and the enemy never again re-entered that town in force. All through the night of September 29-30 wounded were carried back to Bois de Cierges.

This attack was very costly to the 362nd Infantry. Colonel Parker and Major Bradbury of the 362nd were wounded, a number of valuable officers were killed, the total loss of the regiment in killed and wounded being at least five hundred. On the night of September 29 a few rolling kitchens per regiment were drawn up into the woods. The men were able, in turn, to go back to the kitchens and get the first warm food they had had since the evening of September 25. It was impossible to use these kitchens in the daytime without exposing the vicinity to heavy shell fire. Some of the men serving the kitchens were killed and wounded, and some men going to the kitchens for hot coffee were wounded, but the kitchens remained in the woods until the withdrawal on the morning of October 4.

In four days the Division had lost 8 field and 125 company officers and 3,000 men.

FIFTH DAY, SEPTEMBER 30

The line of resistance described above was ordered by the Headquarters, Fifth Corps, for possible defense against a strong force of enemy reported arriving at Exermont. The Division Commander directed that the 361st cover the line of surveillance in front of its brigade, and the 363rd the line of surveillance in front of its brigade. The 362nd was assembled in a stone quarry north of Exmorieux Farm between the Bois de Cierges and the Bois de Baulny. At 3 o\'clock that morning, while wounded were being evacuated from Gesnes, the Division received orders that the attack of the Fifth Corps would not be continued on September 30, but efforts would be made for resumption of the offensive on October 1. The Division reserve was placed near Eclisfontaine, and the battalion of engineers which had been with the 182nd Brigade rejoined the reserve, which then consisted of the 346th Machine Gun Battalion and the 316th Engineers (less one company, still engaged in repairing the road between Epinonville and Very).

At 9 A. M., the Division Commander found only five hundred men of the 362nd present. Others rejoined from the Bois de Cierges during the day, and more wounded were carried that night from Gesnes, having concealed themselves in dugouts and cellars throughout the 30th.

Colonel L. C. Bennett, Division Quartermaster, was assigned to the 364th Infantry when Lient. Colonel Mudgett was wounded on September 29, and joined the regiment in the afternoon of September 30 while it was establishing the defensive line prescribed by the Corps Commander.

W. D. Davis, 361st Infantry, who had been wounded on September 28, still insisted on retaining command of his regiment and was coolly stationing his units on the line of surveillance with his arm in a sling. One battalion of the 363rd Infantry, finding the Bois de Cierges, full of gas, moved forward to the ridge north of the Bois de Cierges, and occupied shell holes made by the German counter barrage on the 29th, but had no overhead shelter. Hostile artillery shelled the entire Division area from 10 o\'clock this day until 8 o\'clock the next day. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade shelles Gesnes and the Gesnes-Exermont road, to prevent traffic, at intervals during the day.

SIXTH DAY, OCTOBER 1

The 91st, having evacuated its wounded and rested and fed its men, was ready to advance again and orders therefore issued, but corps orders required that we wait till the 37th Division had been relieved by the 32nd and the 35th by the 1st Division. During the day the lines of the 32nd could be seen advancing in brilliant form north of Ivoiry, having relieved the 37th Division units, and moving up into Bois Emont and east there of. On the west, elements of the 1st Division advanced with equal brilliancy beyond the positions to which the 35th had retired, and combat liaison was established with the 1st Division near Seneux Farm. A combat liaison group from the 182nd Brigade moving with a battalion of the 1st Division suffered heavy losses as it advanced.

Many men were suffering from diarrhea due to exposure for five days without warm food or overcoats and blankets. Most officers and men had raincoats, and some had found German blankets in dugouts. The men built shelter from small-arms fire by excavating the northern edges of shell holes. But they were observed by hostile planes and subjected to heavy fire (shrapnel and shell) from German artillery in the Argonne and northeast of Gesnes. Although many casualties resulted the morale was undisturbed.

SEVENTH DAY, OCTOBER 2

Troops were still under orders to hold positions awaiting corps orders for attack. A hostile airplane was brought down by an Allied plane in front of the 364th Infantry. A machine gun company of this regiment in position west of Tronsol Farm fired on the enemy in front of the 1st Division as it was marching up on the left of the position held by the 91st. Troops were warned at 20 o\'clock (8 p. M.) to be ready for advance on the morning of October 3. Other divisions not being ready the anticipated attack order was not issued. The Germans attempted to move two companies up the ravine west of Bois de Bajilny, but machine gun fire turned down the ravine stopped the movement. The woods north of Tronsol Farm were cleaned up and occupied until thee Division was relieved. On the right the advance of the 32nd Division through the Bois Emont protected the 91st from machine gun and snipers\' fire, but all parts of the areas were subjected nearly all day to heavy artillery fire.

After the armistice two chaplains with divisional burial parties were sent back to this zone from Belgium by truck to search for graves of 6fficers and men still carried as missing. One of these chaplains found on Hill 255 a German observation post from which every road in the Division zone as far as Very could be plainly seen and every house in Epinonville (Division Headquarters). At this time 2 colonels, 2 lieutenant colonels, 8 majors and 123 company officers of infantry were required to replace officers killed and wounded during the six days of advance. The total casualties at that time amounted to nearly 150 officers and 4,000 men.

About 18 o\'clock (6 P. M.) twenty-eight German bombing planes made a raid on the Division Headquarters, 58th Artillery Brigade and some engineers in the ravine between Epinonville and Very. The first bomb dropped in front of the little brick cottage on the hill occupied by the Division Commander. It killed one orderly and wounded First Lieutenant A. S. MacDonnel, aide, and one enlisted man. Almost immediately thereafter, hostile artillery shelled Division Headquarters and the ravine occupied by the artillery and engineers. Our losses were 35 killed and 115 wounded, in one hour. Although anti-aircraft guns and machine guns from reserve fired upon these bombing planes, none of them fell in our zone. This happened about half an hour after a squadron of Allied planes had passed over Division Headquarters moving toward the Argonne Forest. It is no reflection upon our air service that such a raid was possible. It was realized by Division Headquarters that it was impracticable to have Allied airplanes over the Division constantly. They frequently passed over the zone of the Division and almost invariably German planes returned half an hour after the Allied planes had left.

The Division P. C. had been located in a splinter-proof on the north slope of a depression where it was protected from artillery fire on the south, but not from the north. It was ultilizied mainly for protection from rain and was one of the few shelters in Epinonville available. Almost all houses had been destroyed. This splinter-proof was struck at 21 o\'clock (9 P.M.) by high explosive entering the room occupied as \"message center,\" killing two men, liaison runners, and wounding two officers and one man. This man later died. One of the officers wounded was liaison officer from the 1st Division. The other officer was in charge of the message center for the night. About this time another high-explosive shell hit the stone ruins in which members of the Headquarters Troop and horses were sheltered, killing seven horses. Division P. C. with telephone switchboard was then moved to a cellar under a ruined building in Epinonville, which had since the 29th been used as Headquarters, 58th Artillery Brigade. The German dugouts along the Epinonville-Eclisfontaine road which had been functioning since the night of the 29th of September as First Aid station operated by the 363rd Ambulance Company, were not struck, although plainly exposed to fire from the north.

EIGHTH DAY, OCTOBER 3

There was little hostile activity until 10:40 o\'clock. From that time until 20 o\'clock hostile artillery was more violent than at any time during the previous engagement. This was doubtless due to observation by the enemy that divisions on the right and left of the 91st had been relieved, and the enemy was undoubtedly shelling the entire front of the Fifth Corps as well as the First Corps to cover the withdrawal or break-up formation of the relieving divisions. Throughout the past few days the plank road between Very and Epinonville received high-explosive shells frequently, and two companies of engineers were kept busy repairing holes in order that rations and ammunition might go forward at night and the wounded be evacuated to the rear, either by ambulance, truck or wagon. Three ambulance companies were at established stations along the ravine from Epinonville to the south. Field hospitals were in the neighborhood of Very and east thereof. Machine guns of the 346th Machine Gun Battalion from the orchard near Epinonville frequently fired upon hostile planes. The 32nd Division relieved a battalion of the 361st Infantry which had held Grange aux Bois Farm since September 29. By this time the 361st Infantry had lost 36 officers and 793 men.

The 362nd Infantry after retiring from Gesnes had held the stone quarry between the 181st and 182nd Brigades and on the line of resistance the Division was ordered to hold. Lieut. Colonel J. B. Woolnough had succeeded to command of that regiment after Colonel Parker was wounded. The regiment was unable to advance under the corps order, but suffered heavy losses because of lack of overhead shelter.

Later in the afternoon instructions were received from Headquarters, Fifth Corps, stating that the 91st Division, less the 58th Artillery Brigade, would be relieved by midnight, by an extension of front of the 32nd Division toward the west. The 91st Division was ordered to assemble as corps reserve at Bois de Very and Bois de Cheppy, south of the Cheppy-Montfaucon road. The 91st Division units were moved straight to the rear after being relieved, leaving the roads and trails at the disposal of the 32nd Division. The Commanding General of the 64th Brigade reached the headquarters of the 91st Division about 6 p.m. and guides from all units of the 91st Division were assembled there by dark, to conduct units of the 64th Brigade to positions held by the 91st Division. This movement seemed to be suspected by the enemy, as all roads and especially road crossings were subjected to heavy artillery fire throughout the night.

At 4 o\'clock the 64th Brigade reported that all units of the 91st Division had been relieved. Division Headquarters then moved back to Very crossroads. A general attack had been ordered for about 5 o\'clock. The complete relief of the 181st, however, was not effected until 9 :30 o\'clock. During the morning of the 4th the 3rd Battalion of the 363rd was relieved, and by noon of the 4th the elements of the 363rd Infantry and 348th Machine Gun Battalion still holding the lines of surveillance in front of the Boix de Baulny and at Tronsol Farm were relieved. During the morning the elements which had not been relieved remained at their posts until relieved, notwithstanding they knew they should have been relieved at midnight. The German artillery fire directed against the general advance of the First and Fifth Corps caused fifty casualties in the 91st Division on October 4. By afternoon of that date the units had been assembled in the woods designated above. It was possible to supply all with warm food, mail from the States was distributed and the men rested, although under long-range fire.

October 5 and 6 the Division rested as corps reserve, and arms and other equipment lost in action were largely replaced.

On the afternoon of Sunday, October 6, order were received for the Division to march to Dombasle and Jouy en Argonne, which places were south of the Fifth Corps Headquarters. The march was necessarily to be conducted at night, leaving Ravin de la Fuon by 19 o\'clock. After the 182nd Brigade had formed for the night march, orders were received from Headquarters, Fifth Corps, to detach one infantry brigade, leaving it in its present position and reporting it to the Chief of Staff, First Army Corps, for further orders. From that time until the 181st Brigade rejoined the Division on October 16, at Revigny, that brigade, as will be later described, served with the 1st Division, First Corps, and the 32nd Division, Fifth Corps, and later with the 1st Division, Fifth Corps. The remainder of the Division on October 9, 10 and 11 marched south to the Nettancourt area headquarters at Contrisson. MOre can be read at [link removed by ]

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